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Judicial Review and Monopoly Power: 
Some Sceptical Thoughts 
Alexander Williams 
 
The issue of which functions are ‘public’ and amenable to judicial review at common law has exercised 
judges and scholars for decades. Elias L.J. and Mitting J. recently observed that the amenability 
question “is not always easily answered”, and that the application of the relevant principles “can be 
problematic”,1 but these were unusually restrained judicial remarks. Woolf J. has previously declared 
that “there is no universal test” for a public function;2 Ognall J. that the matter is “one of overall 
impression, and one of degree”;3 and Scott Baker L.J. that it is “often as much a matter of feel, as 
deciding whether any particular criteria are met”.4 Lord Diplock once hailed the courts’ efforts in 
developing our system of administrative law as “the greatest achievement of the English courts in my 
judicial lifetime”,5 but their treatment of the crucial threshold issue of when a defendant is caught by that 
system is notoriously unclear. 
In this article I pursue two objectives: one narrow, the other broader. The narrow objective is to 
mount a considered reply to the arguments of Colin Campbell, who attempts to rationalise the bulk of 
the courts’ voluminous case-law according to an elegantly clear and simple test: that a public function is 
the exercise of a monopoly power.6 I focus on Campbell’s work because it is relatively recent, has yet to 
receive detailed published scrutiny,7 and is commendably ambitious. Significantly, he remains the only 
author to make a concerted attempt to explain the case-law according to a single test, whereas other 
literature tends to argue that the cases reveal multiple, alternative models at work.8 Campbell also 
defends the monopoly model from both doctrinal and normative angles, arguing not just that it does 
underlie the case-law but also that it should. This is in contrast to the various works that tend to 
                                                          
 Lecturer in Law, University of Durham. I am grateful to Daniel Attenborough, Paul Craig, David Feldman, Helen 
Fenwick, William Lucy, Gavin Phillipson and an anonymous referee for comments on earlier iterations of my ideas. The 
usual disclaimer applies. 
1 R (Holmcroft Properties) v K.P.M.G. [2016] EWHC 323 (Admin); [2016] A.C.D. 67, at [23]. 
2 R v Derbyshire County Council, ex p. Noble [1990] I.C.R. 808, at 819; [1990] I.R.L.R. 32. 
3 R v Legal Aid Board, ex p. Donn [1996] 3 All E.R. 1, at 11. 
4 R (Tucker) v Director General of the National Crime Squad [2003] EWCA Civ 57; [2003] I.C.R. 599, at [13]. 
5 R v I.R.C., ex p. National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses [1982] A.C. 617, at 641; [1981] 2 All E.R. 93. 
6 Colin Campbell, ‘Monopoly Power as Public Power for the Purposes of Judicial Review’ (2009) 125 L.Q.R. 491. 
7 Brief critical analysis can be found in Mark Elliott, ‘Judicial Review’s Scope, Foundations and Purposes: Joining the Dots’ 
[2012] N.Z.L.R. 75, at 77-78. 
8 These are commonly the ‘but for’ and ‘statutory underpinning’ tests, which have been critiqued elsewhere and are not 
considered further here: see Colin Campbell, ‘The nature of power as public in English judicial review’ [2009] C.L.J. 90. 
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concentrate on either theory or doctrine in isolation from the other,9 scholarly and impressive though the 
analysis may be. I argue however that Campbell’s model is unworkable, being vulnerable to a number 
of serious problems on both normative and doctrinal planes. In making this point my aim is to clear the 
way for the advancement of a superior model in future work. 
For my second (broader) objective, I join Mark Elliott10 in questioning the idea that seems to lie at 
the heart of Campbell’s and a great deal of other thinking in the field: that the public-function test should 
contain little or no reference to the source of the power, focussing on the ‘nature’ of the power instead. 
This thinking has been the fashion since R v Panel of Take-overs and Mergers, ex p. Datafin,11 where 
the Court of Appeal held that the City of London’s self-appointed takeover regulator was amenable to 
judicial review notwithstanding that it operated “without [any] visible means of legal support”.12 It was 
stressed that source is not necessarily decisive: statutory power is clearly reviewable and contractual 
power clearly not, but “in between these extremes there is an area in which it is helpful to look not just 
at the source of the power but at the nature of the power.”13 
Distinguished commentators widely viewed Datafin as effecting a seismic shift from source to 
nature of power. Christopher Forsyth remarked that “The trend is plainly away from technical issues of 
form and towards matters of substance.”14 To Murray Hunt, “It was clear... that the thrust of the decision 
was to move from a ‘source of power’ test for reviewability to a ‘nature of the function’ test.”15 Sir 
William Wade stated that “the Court now stresses that sources are irrelevant, and that all that matters is 
the exercise of non-contractual power in the public domain.”16 Yet the normative case for this shift is 
seldom made clear, either by judges or scholars. Much of it seems to stem from the belief that a 
source-based approach is unsuitable following the growth of non-state power in public life in recent 
decades, particularly in the wake of what is termed the “hollowing-out of the state”17 that has continued 
to occur since the Thatcher years. Since public power may be exercised increasingly by private bodies, 
“political and legal developments… have seriously undermined the institutional understanding of the 
public/private distinction”.18 Source of power has come to be viewed as an “arbitrary” factor, as one 
                                                          
9 See e.g. Anna Grear, ‘Theorising the Rainbow? The Puzzle of the Public-Private Divide’ (2003) Res Publica 169; Julia 
Black, ‘Constitutionalising Self-Regulation’ (1996) 59 M.L.R. 24. 
10 Elliott [2012] NZLR 75. 
11 [1987] Q.B. 815; [1987] 1 All E.R. 564. 
12 Datafin [1987] Q.B. 815, at 824 (Donaldson M.R.). 
13 Datafin [1987] Q.B. 815, at 847 (Lloyd L.J.). 
14 Christopher Forsyth, ‘The scope of judicial review: “public duty” not “source of power”’ [1987] P.L. 356, at 362. 
15 Murray Hunt, ‘Constitutionalism and the Contractualisation of Government in the United Kingdom’, in Michael Taggart 
(ed), The Province of Administrative Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997) p 21, at p 29. 
16 Sir William Wade, ‘New vistas of judicial review’ (1987) 103 L.Q.R. 323, at 325-326. 
17 R.A.W. Rhodes, ‘The Hollowing Out of the State: The Changing Nature of the Public Service in Britain’ (1994) 65 Political 
Quarterly 138. 
18 Peter Cane, ‘Accountability and the Public/Private Distinction’, in Nicholas Bamforth and Peter Leyland (eds), Public Law 
in a Multi-Layered Constitution’ (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003) p 247, at pp 253-254. 
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author very recently described it,19 the modern focus shifting to the nature of the power that it is felt 
should be amenable to review. Along these lines, Lloyd L.J. emphasised in Datafin that the City Panel 
“wielded enormous power” and had “a giant’s strength”;20 and Donaldson M.R. that the law needed to 
check that power, for the benefit of those “oppressed” by the Panel’s conduct, in the event that the 
Panel were to go “off the rails”.21 
The idea that source can be cast aside in this way demands close scrutiny. Not only does it 
overlook the theoretical importance of source of power, but problems also arise with attempting to 
extend judicial review to the activities of non-state bodies that exercise only de facto power, i.e. liberty 
to do as they wish within the confines of the law. While some of these concerns are reflected to a 
certain extent in Elliott’s work, in my view his attachment to source of power is not strong enough. 
There are reasons for disagreeing even with his thesis, as I explain. 
Overall, then, I am critical not just of Campbell’s thesis but also of the broader underlying idea that 
source of power has had its day. My argument proceeds in three steps. Part A examines the normative 
choice to be made between nature and source of power, using Campbell’s model and Elliott’s 
arguments as a springboard for discussion of the problems with eschewing or minimising source as a 
core criterion for amenability. I also offer some brief thoughts on the related issue of the government’s 
‘third-source’ powers, explaining why Adam Perry’s recent thesis as to their constitutional basis is 
unpersuasive.22 Parts B and C then turn to the narrower objective of dissecting the monopoly model. 
Part B explains the various flaws in Campbell’s normative case, Part C in his doctrinal one. 
 
A. ESCHEWING SOURCE OF POWER 
 
Campbell defines monopoly power as power exercised by one body alone.23 The crux of his normative 
case is that monopoly power ought to be exercised fairly, and must therefore be amenable to judicial 
review according to the broad grounds of illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. Individuals 
subject to monopoly power are vulnerable to unfair and arbitrary treatment because they are 
necessarily unable to find another provider to perform the function in question if they are unhappy with 
the treatment they receive.24 
                                                          
19 Eleanor Aspey, ‘The search for the true public law element: judicial review of procurement decisions’ [2016] P.L. 35, at 49. 
See also Sue Arrowsmith, ‘Judicial Review and the Contractual Powers of Public Authorities’ (1990) 106 L.Q.R. 277, at 288. 
20 Datafin [1987] Q.B. 815, at 845. 
21 Datafin [1987] Q.B. 815, at 827. 
22 Adam Perry, ‘The Crown’s Administrative Powers’ (2015) 131 L.Q.R. 652. 
23 Campbell (2009) 125 L.Q.R. 491, at 491. 
24 Campbell (2009) 125 L.Q.R. 491, at 507-511. See also e.g. David Pannick, ‘Who is subject to judicial review and in 
respect of what?’ [1992] P.L. 1, at 3-5. 
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The monopoly model therefore reduces the amenability issue to a single question: whether the 
power is monopolistic. In doing so it abandons all reference to the source of the power. Every 
monopolistic function becomes public in nature, whether performed under statute or the prerogative, or 
performed with no positive legal basis at all. The principles of good administration are therefore given 
‘horizontal’ effect: they apply as much to the monopoly functions of non-state actors – self-regulators 
like the Jockey Club, for instance – as to the monopoly functions of organs of state such as government 
ministers and local authorities. This is no oversight on Campbell’s part. It is a manifestation of the 
fashionable view, mentioned above, that private organisations may wield considerable power over 
individuals that requires regulation by the courts in judicial review, notwithstanding that the power lacks 
any statutory or prerogative source. As Campbell remarks, “there is no particular reason to suppose 
that… power exercised pursuant to law would be any more prone to being exercised unpredictably 
than… power exercised de facto”.25 Two problems arise with eschewing source of power, however, as 
the following sections explain. 
 
(i) Source of Power Matters 
 
It is a mistake to think that source of power should be irrelevant to the definition of a public function. 
Source does matter. The academic literature is replete with examples of a power’s source being sharply 
contrasted with its ‘nature’ or ‘substance’,26 which are said to focus on the impact or effect of a power 
on the individual in a way that source does not. As we saw above, Wade’s impression of Datafin was 
that it rendered source considerations irrelevant in the amenability context by focussing the courts on 
the nature of the power. But bright-line distinctions like these are liable to mislead, by giving the 
simplistic impression of ‘nature good, source bad’. As we will see below, the reality is subtler: that 
power from certain sources can be said to have a particular public quality about it that power from other 
sources does not.27 
I am not the only author to doubt that source should be irrelevant. Elliott argues that the amenability 
question requires the balancing of three interlocking considerations as to the purpose of judicial review: 
(a) ensuring compliance with the rule of law, in that “those exercising legal powers must not be 
permitted to exceed the limits of those powers”; (b) the uniqueness of the government’s position, in that 
it “is uniquely devoid of any legitimate self-interests”; and (c) securing the public interest in good 
                                                          
25 Campbell (2009) 125 L.Q.R. 491, at 513. 
26 See e.g. Gerdy Jurgens and Frank Van Ommeren, ‘The public-private divide in English and Dutch law: a multi-functional 
and context-dependant divide’ [2012] C.L.J. 172, at 184; Aspey [2016] P.L. 35, at 51; Michael Beloff, ‘Pitch, pool, rink,... 
court? Judicial review in the sporting world’ [1989] P.L. 95, at 108. 
27 For a similar remark, see Nicholas Bamforth, ‘The scope of judicial review: still uncertain’ [1993] P.L. 239, at 241. 
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governance, in that “the public is entitled to expect that governmental decisions will accord with 
standards of good administration”.28 Elliott concedes that there is no “magic bullet”29 for determining 
amenability and that his suggestions do not necessarily supply “easy answers”,30 but nevertheless 
believes them to provide a “clearly articulated framework of principle” for confronting the relevant 
issues.31 
Elliott’s considerations (a) and (b) – rule of law, and government uniqueness – clearly imply a focus 
on source of power, because they drive at identifying and reviewing the kind of powers that pertain to 
government rather than anyone else. He acknowledges that (a) and (b) overlap: “the unique 
powerfulness of government follows from the extent of its legal powers, control of which is required 
under the principle of legality”.32 But his focus is not on source of power alone: consideration (b) is said 
to justify reviewing government ‘third-source’ power,33 discussed below, which allows the Crown to 
engage in certain forms of activity without having to show a positive legal basis in statute or the 
prerogative; and consideration (c), securing the public interest in good governance, is said to provide 
for horizontal effect of the principles of good administration against the public functions of private 
defendants, when a focus on considerations (a) and (b) alone would lead to an “under-inclusive” scope 
of review.34 Elliott’s thesis has much to commend to it, but despite the common ground between us his 
approach is ultimately unconvincing. 
 To show why, it is necessary to think about why source of power is normatively significant. For 
Elliott, it is because considerations (a) and (b) form two of three core considerations as to the 
underlying purpose of judicial review. That is why he believes them to be relevant to the amenability 
question: the courts are said to be unable to answer that question without “a clear vision of the 
purposes of judicial review”.35 But it seems to me that this downplays the normative position. In my view 
the source of power is important for the more obvious reason that it provides us with a settled and 
workable blueprint for the meaning of publicness, which is now a staple feature of the law in this area. 
English law differs materially from Scots judicial review, for instance, where the reviewability of a given 
function “does not depend upon any distinction between public law and private law”, the Scottish courts’ 
concern being the broader one of policing the decision-making of “any person or body to whom a 
jurisdiction, power or authority has been delegated or entrusted by statute, agreement or any other 
                                                          
28 Elliott [2012] NZLR 75, at 78-80. 
29 Elliott [2012] NZLR 75, at 83. 
30 Elliott [2012] NZLR 75, at 110. 
31 Elliott [2012] NZLR 75, at 110. 
32 Elliott [2012] NZLR 75, at 79. 
33 Elliott [2012] NZLR 75, at 80; 93-97. 
34 Elliott [2012] NZLR 75, at 87. 
35 Elliott [2012] NZLR 75, at 75. 
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instrument.”36 But in English law the public-private distinction is firmly entrenched in the case-law, which 
couches the scope of judicial review in terms of public functions, elements and duties, as various 
rulings including but also predating Datafin make clear.37 It is also reflected in the Civil Procedure 
Rules, which define a claim for judicial review as a claim to review an enactment “or decision, action or 
failure to act in relation to the exercise of a public function”;38 and by the procedural exclusivity rule, 
which prevents litigants from abusing the process of the court by pursuing the wrong public-private 
procedure for their claim.39 Commentators may question the point of employing a public-private 
distinction in the English amenability context,40 and their criticisms may be powerful, but it is evident 
that at least some thought must be given to the conceptual question of what a public function is. This is 
what the law requires. With respect to Elliott, the question cannot be answered simply by asking the 
instrumental question of what judicial review is for. 
Publicness is a slippery concept, however, as Elliott acknowledges.41 Very few functions will be 
universally agreed to be public or private by their nature alone.42 At the heart of the issue lies the 
essentially political matter of which functions the state should perform, of the proper role of the state.43 
To have the greatest chance of persuading, the definition of publicness must therefore be derived, as 
far as possible, from settled considerations about the nature and role of the state. After all, it is the 
existence of a state, as distinct from the individual, that gives rise to a certain ineradicable distinction 
between public and private,44 however intractable the more abstract question of the ‘correct’ meaning of 
a public function may be. 
In my view it is possible to arrive at a source-based distinction between public and private functions 
with reference to these considerations alone, without needing to rely on ideas about the underlying 
purpose of judicial review. This is important for reasons of clarity in the amenability test. Judicial review 
may be said to have any number of different purposes or justifications, which makes for inevitable 
difficulties when attempting to determine the amenability issue reliably. This is especially problematic 
                                                          
36 West v Secretary of State for Scotland 1992 S.L.T. 636, at 650. 
37 E.g. Malloch v Aberdeen Corporation (No. 1) [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1578, at 1596 (Lord Wilberforce); [1973] 1 All E.R. 304; Law 
v National Greyhound Racing Club [1983] 1 W.L.R. 1302, at 1307 (Lawton L.J.); [1983] 3 All E.R. 300; R v East Berkshire 
Health Authority, ex p. Walsh [1985] Q.B. 152, at 164 (Donaldson M.R.); [1984] 3 All E.R. 425. 
38 Part 54.1(2)(a)(ii).  
39 O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 A.C. 237; [1982] 3 All E.R. 1124. 
40 E.g. Carol Harlow, ‘“Public” and “Private” Law: Definition Without Distinction’ (1980) 43 M.L.R. 241. 
41 Elliott [2012] NZLR 75, at 76-77; Mark Elliott, ‘”Public” and “Private”: Defining the Scope of the Human Rights Act’ [2007] 
C.L.J. 485, at 487. 
42 Peter Cane, ‘Self Regulation and Judicial Review’ [1987] C.J.Q. 324, at 337. 
43 Nicholas Bamforth, ‘The Public Law-Private Law Distinction: A Comparative and Philosophical Approach’, in Peter 
Leyland and Terry Woods, Administrative Law Facing the Future: Old Constrains & New Horizons (London: Blackstone 
Press, 1997) p 136, at p 152; Janet McLean, ‘Public Function Tests: Bringing Back the State?’, in David Dyzenhaus et al, A 
Simple Common Lawyer: Essays in Honour of Michael Taggart (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009) p 185, at p 185. 
44 For recent discussions as to the nature and role of the state, see Janet McLean, Searching for the State in British Legal 
Thought: Competing Conceptions of the Public Sphere (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Nick Barber, The 
Constitutional State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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when those purposes are simply to be weighed together in a multi-factorial assessment or balancing 
exercise, as Elliott contends. Although he limits his balancing exercise to the three core considerations 
(a) to (c), he fails to explain why a potentially infinite number of other considerations could not also 
come into play. He disagrees, for instance, that the sole purpose of judicial review is to protect against 
abuse of power, or abuse of monopoly power,45 but it is not apparent why these considerations could 
not still feature in his balancing exercise as two of multiple different purposes.46 Indeed, ‘red-light’ 
theorists would attach considerable weight to the purpose of preventing abuse of power, arguing that 
Elliott’s relatively ‘green-light’ focus on securing the public interest in good governance – consideration 
(c) – misses the point.47 
Elliott is right to attach weight to the uniqueness of the state, and to observe that this factor is 
closely tied to the principle of legality. My issue with his thesis is not that considerations (a) and (b) 
feature in his arguments, but rather with his reason for believing them to be important. It is not 
necessarily because they are two of three core purposes of judicial review, but because source of 
power provides a blueprint for publicness that can be derived from settled constitutional foundations 
about the nature and role of the state. 
The starting point for this proposition is that the individual and the state operate in fundamentally 
different ways – necessarily so, given their differing constitutional positions. Individuals enjoy the liberty 
to do whatever is not unlawful, as Laws J. recognised in R v Somerset County Council, ex p. Fewings.48 
Individuals are also equal before the law, meaning that any unwanted inroads they make into the 
legally-protected interests of others will be unlawful. Hence the importance to private dealings of the law 
of contract, for instance,49 which elevates agreements with the necessary features to the status of a set 
of legally-enforceable rights and duties that would otherwise not exist. 
Whereas individuals are equal before the law, however, the individual and the state are in a 
relationship of necessary “juridical inequality”.50 The state is “obliged (and, therefore, empowered) to 
pursue and promote the public interest even at significant expense to the freedom of private agents to 
pursue their own projects and purposes.”51 The state’s position gives it considerable power – to tax, 
imprison, and so on – but the state also claims the authority to wield that power, as emphasised by 
                                                          
45 Elliott [2012] NZLR 75, at 76-78. 
46 Elliott even uses this consideration in one aspect of his analysis, at 99. 
47 For discussion see Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings, Law and Administration 3rd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009) Ch. 1. 
48 [1995] 1 All E.R. 513; 92 L.G.R. 674. 
49 The same could be said of trusts, which I discuss no further: in the present context it is contractual power that receives by 
far the greater academic and judicial attention. 
50 The term is Peter Cane’s, ‘Tort Law and Public Functions’, in John Oberdiek (ed), Philosophical Foundations of the Law of 
Torts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p 148. 
51 Cane, ‘Tort Law and Public Functions’, at p 149. 
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theorists like H.L.A. Hart52 and Leslie Green.53 Precisely how it makes good this claim to authority is a 
complex theoretical issue that it is unnecessary to explore any further here, but it is nevertheless clear 
that the state must at least use its power for the public benefit rather than for its own ends. Any state 
unwilling to observe the basic requirement of serving rather than owning its subjects would lack 
legitimacy, having power but no authority. 
Two consequences follow. The first is that the state is unique in lacking any interests of its own. 
Whereas individuals may pursue their own ends, including selfishly if they wish, it is clear that the state 
may not.54 Dawn Oliver remarks that organs of state “are regarded as being under duties to act only in 
the public interest as they perceive it to be”;55 Laws J. explains that the state has “no rights of its own, 
no axe to grind beyond its public responsibility”.56 This is the thrust of Elliott’s consideration (b), albeit 
that he refers to the uniqueness of the position of “government” rather than the state. The second 
consequence is that the state lacks the same liberty enjoyed by individuals to do whatever is not 
unlawful. Whereas individuals enjoy residual freedom (i.e. de facto power) to do as they wish, the basic 
rule for the state is that “any action to be taken must be justified by positive law”.57 This is reflected in 
Elliott’s consideration (a), that the principle of legality requires the courts to police the boundaries of 
legal power in judicial review. 
The upshot is that the state must act with specific legal authority, whereas individuals, being free to 
do whatever is not unlawful, go about their business using de facto and contractual power. A blueprint 
for publicness therefore emerges: that statutory and prerogative power are public, bearing the hallmark 
of state activity;58 and that de facto and contractual power, bearing the hallmark of individual activity, 
are private. 
Elliott’s alternative focus on the purpose of judicial review gives rise to difficulties. Perhaps because 
it is difficult to pinpoint the exact purposes and justifications of judicial review with any real confidence, 
Elliott treats source of power not as giving rise to hard-edged rules about amenability but rather as one 
of three core considerations, to be balanced against the others. Thus, consideration (c), securing the 
public interest in good governance, becomes relevant as a countervailing consideration when a purely 
source-based focus is thought to be too narrow.59 It is consideration (c) that is said to tell in favour of 
reviewing non-statutory power exercised by bodies that are not institutionally part of the state, examples 
                                                          
52 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
53 Leslie Green, The Authority of the State (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988). 
54 Cane, ‘Tort Law and Public Functions’, at p 149. 
55 See also Dawn Oliver, ‘The frontiers of the State: public authorities and public functions under the Human Rights Act’ 
[2000] P.L. 476, at 483. 
56 Fewings [1995] 1 All E.R. 513, at 524. 
57 Fewings [1995] 1 All E.R. 513, at 524. 
58 For similar remarks see Dawn Oliver, ‘Functions of a public nature under the Human Rights Act’ [2004] P.L. 329, at 345. 
59 Elliott [2012] NZLR 75, at 87. 
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being the City Panel in Datafin and private organisations that provide contracted-out services on the 
state’s behalf.60  
Consideration (c) is desperately imprecise, however. There is something in saying that good 
governance is one of judicial review’s various abstract purposes, but quite how it is supposed to assist 
in hard cases by steering the courts towards a decision about whether or not to review the functions of 
organisations like the City Panel and government contractors, is unclear. The idea that there is a 
sufficiently settled meaning of “good governance”, or even of “securing the public interest”, is highly 
doubtful. Elliott’s explanation of the term – that “governmental decisions will accord with the standards 
of good administration”61 – simply begs the question whether a given decision/function is governmental 
or not, when the defendant is neither an organ of the state nor acting pursuant to legal powers that 
have been positively conferred on it. He argues that consideration (c) is useful because it “supplies the 
normative basis for the content of many of the controls enforced via judicial review”,62 but the claim is 
difficult to assess for the simple reason that the content of consideration (c) is so unclear. We should 
also be able to do better than a multi-factorial approach in which the different considerations are simply 
balanced as mere principles, their relative weight falling to be determined on an apparently case-by-
case basis by individual judges. Elliott’s thesis is helpful for attempting to limit this multi-factorial 
assessment to three core principles, but a great deal of room would seem to remain for judicial 
guesswork to dictate the outcome. 
A better approach would therefore be a harder-edged one that does away with the idea of treating 
source of power simply as a principle, taking it instead as the basis of a rule to apply about when 
judicial review will and will not lie.63 Elliott disagrees, arguing that a principles-based approach is in 
keeping with (and possibly also mandated by)64 the notion that amenability “is a matter of degree”, 
forming “part of a broader analysis that also acknowledges the inaptness of a wholly rigid distinction 
between public and private law”.65 But although overlaps between the substantive principles of public 
and private law exist,66 his apparent conclusion – that they render a principles-based approach to 
amenability irresistible – simply does not follow. There are overlaps between other areas of law that are 
otherwise distinguished along bright lines. The fact that a duty to take reasonable care finds expression 
not just in the law of negligence but can also be a term of a contract, or can form the basis of the actus 
                                                          
60 Elliott [2012] NZLR 75, at 83-85; 105-110. 
61 Elliott [2012] NZLR 75, at 80. 
62 Elliott [2012] NZLR 75, at 80. 
63 On this distinction see Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977), at pp 22-28. 
64 Elliott [2012] NZLR 75, at 92. 
65 Elliott [2012] NZLR 75, at 82. 
66 See notably Dawn Oliver, Common Values and the Public-Private Divide (London: Butterworths, 1999). 
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reus for gross negligence manslaughter, does not mean that the distinctions between tort, contract and 
criminal law suddenly disintegrate into questions of degree. 
This is not to suggest however that source of power is the only criterion in the public-function test. 
Like Elliott,67 I question whether the exercise of statutory power should always be sufficient to trigger 
judicial review.68 Tentatively, I would suggest adding a second criterion: that the legal power in question 
is a power to act in the public interest rather than simply in the interests of the power-holder.69 This 
criterion plays into the meaning of publicness because it reflects the ‘other-regarding’ purpose of the 
state as distinct from the individual, as described above.70 It would also explain three things. First, it 
would explain why there has been no apparent criticism of the decision to review the use by a 
psychiatric hospital of statutory powers to detain and treat inpatients against their will.71 Although a non-
state organisation, the hospital is clearly exercising powers that can only be used “in the interests of 
[the detainee’s] own health or safety or with a view to the protection of other persons”,72 and never in 
the interests of the hospital alone. Second, it would explain why there is no apparent call for judicial 
review to apply when individuals make use of statutory causes of action enabling them to sue others in 
harassment, for example. Not only is this better described along Hohfeldian lines as the vindication of a 
statutory right than the exercise of a statutory power,73 but it is also clear that the purpose is for 
protecting the claimant’s own interests, and not – at least primarily, anyway – for any public-interest 
purpose. Third, it would explain the difficulty with determining whether decisions by the state to contract 
with other bodies, and on what terms,74 should be amenable to review.75 (This is of course distinct from 
the issue of reviewing the exercise of the contractual power itself, which in my view is ruled out because 
contractual power has a private source). It is a question that will depend heavily on the perceived 
justification for allowing the state to engage in behaviour that is typical of individuals. On one view it 
could be said that all state contracting powers ultimately exist for the public interest and therefore 
belong in judicial review. As Anne Davies argues, “The government does not cease to be the 
                                                          
67 Elliott [2012] NZLR 75, at 84. 
68 See also Paul Craig, ‘Public Law Control over Private Power’, in Taggart, The Province of Administrative Law, p 196, at p 
198; Jack Beatson, ‘Public and Private in English Administrative Law’ (1987) 103 L.Q.R. 34, at 47. 
69 Oliver has made similar remarks in the HRA context: [2004] P.L 329, at 345. 
70 The test is therefore relatively simple, not to be confused with the complex public-choice question of whether the act is 
actually in the public interest. 
71 See R (A) v Partnerships in Care Ltd. [2002] EWHC 529 (Admin); [2002] 1 W.L.R. 2610. 
72 Mental Health Act 1983, ss.2(2)(b), 3(2)(c). 
73 On which see W.N. Hohfeld, ‘Some Fundamental Legal Concepts as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’ (1913-14) 23 Yale 
L.J. 16, at 30. 
74 For recent challenge to the terms of a central government tendering process, see R (London Borough of Enfield) v 
Secretary of State for Transport [2016] EWCA Civ 480. 
75 For discussion of the complex case-law, see A.C.L. Davies, The Public Law of Government Contracts (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008); Stephen Bailey, ‘Judicial Review of Contracting Decisions’ [2007] P.L. 444; Aspey [2016] P.L. 35. 
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government simply because it is placing a contract”.76 But on another view – perhaps the neoliberal 
view that fetishizes deregulation and choice as a means of improving decision-making – it could be said 
that it is more conducive to the state’s ultimate public-interest role to allow it some latitude to act 
‘privately’;77 to be able to make commercial decisions ostensibly in its own interests, unencumbered by 
the substantive principles of judicial review and amenable only to the ‘ordinary’ common law of contract, 
tort and so on.78 The issue clearly has deep political-philosophical roots, but framing it in this way may 
at least help to understand why it is so tricky to answer. 
Not only may there be other components to the source-based test, but there is also a case for 
saying that a broad-brush approach to the notion of legal power may be appropriate if considerations of 
fairness require it.79 As in any area of law, context will play an important role in the interpretation of 
legal doctrine. In the contracting-out setting, for instance, it may be possible to argue that statutory 
power is being exercised when a private contractor delivers a service on behalf of a state ‘delegator’ – a 
central or local government body – that the delegator would otherwise be statutorily required or 
empowered to deliver itself.80 It may also be possible to argue that this power is conferred for the public 
interest rather than the interests of the contractor alone, because it is conferred pursuant to the 
delegator’s statutory powers and duties to ensure the service-user is provided for. Once again, the 
arguments in this and the previous paragraph are tentative; the precise content of a source-based 
conception of a public function remains an issue for future work, as I have said. For present purposes, 
my point is that we do not necessarily need to conceive of the amenability test in terms of the balancing 
of mere principles. If there is a reason to take source of power seriously in determining the meaning of 
a public function, as argued here and as Elliott seems to agree, then principled application of a source-
based rule would appear to yield a clearer, more structured solution to the amenability issue. 
Returning then to the principal argument in this section, Campbell’s monopoly model is deficient 
because it overlooks the normative significance of source of power. While Elliott’s approach does make 
it a factor, I have argued that its importance is still underplayed. In the sections below I consider and 
answer some potential counter-arguments to my points: (a) the third-source powers argument; (b) the 
argument from scope of review; and (c) the doctrinal argument. 
                                                          
76 Davies, The Public Law of Government Contracts, at p 63. See also Arrowsmith (1990) 106 L.Q.R. 277, at 283. 
77 In this regard it has been suggested that “the classic areas in which judicial review will be available in the context of 
commercial activities of public bodies… [are the limited ones of] fraud, corruption, bad faith etc.”: R (Menai Collect) v 
Department for Constitutional Affairs [2006] EWHC 724, at [42] (McCombe J.). See also R (Gamesa Energy UK) v National 
Assembly for Wales [2006] EWHC 2167 (Admin), at [67] (Gibbs J.). 
78 Parliament not uncommonly allows local authorities broad discretion to transact e.g. for “a commercial purpose” (as in 
s.1(4)(b), Localism Act 2011) or in “any manner they wish” (s.123(1), Local Government Act 1972). 
79 For now I reserve my opinion on whether it should be read to encompass “soft” law, recently discussed by Greg Weeks, 
Soft Law and Public Authorities (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016). 
80 As in Y.L. v Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 27; [2008] 1 A.C. 95. 
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Third-Source Powers 
I mentioned third-source powers briefly above. They allow the Crown to engage in certain kinds of 
activity, such as forming contracts and issuing passports, without demonstrating any statutory or 
prerogative basis for its actions.81 In this sense the Crown therefore enjoys a similar freedom to 
individuals, to do as it pleases within the confines of the law. 
The constitutional basis and extent of third-source powers is unclear, but two competing 
conceptions have been proffered. Adam Perry argues that there are two different ‘third’ sources; he 
therefore prefers the label “administrative powers” to third-source powers. He argues that while some 
third-source powers can be seen as powers to do “whatever a natural person has a common law power 
to do”,82 most are better explained as non-legal powers that are socially recognised as being available. 
He therefore disagrees with Bruce Harris’s alternative explanation, that third-source powers are residual 
freedoms to do whatever the law does not already prohibit.83 Perry criticises what he sees as Harris’s 
false assumption that residual freedoms can translate into powers, arguing that “The Crown is permitted 
[free] to do some things it has no power to do… [such as] solving the Middle East crisis in a day, flying 
to Jupiter, [and] repealing all the laws of France”.84 Perry also takes issue with the idea that third-source 
powers must be seen as having a legal basis, hence his “social recognition” justification for most of 
them. 
Space precludes anything more than brief discussion of this complex issue, but I raise it because 
both accounts might be thought to present difficulties for my argument that the law should follow a 
source-based amenability test. If third-source powers really are residual freedoms similar to those 
enjoyed by individuals (Harris’s account), or if at least some of them are not legal powers (Perry’s), then 
the basis for regarding them as functions with a public source might seem unclear.85 
There are two responses to this point. First, neither author’s account of the constitutional basis for 
third-source power seems right. Perry’s “social recognition” account entails that some of the Crown’s 
powers are “outside the law”,86 which Perry admits is an “unusual and serious threat to the rule of 
law”.87 Of the two accounts, Harris’s therefore seems preferable – although both are open to question 
for drawing analogies with the position of the individual, an approach that has been forcefully criticised 
                                                          
81 As recognised in e.g. R (New London College) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] UKSC 51; [2013] 1 
W.L.R. 2358. 
82 Perry (2015) 131 L.Q.R. 652, at 658. 
83 Bruce Harris, ‘The “Third Source” of Authority for Government Action’ (1992) 108 L.Q.R. 626; ‘The “Third Source” of 
Authority for Government Action Revisited’ (2007) 123 L.Q.R. 225. 
84 Perry (2015) 131 L.Q.R. 652, at 656. 
85 Elliott [2012] NZLR 75, at 83. 
86 Perry (2015) 131 L.Q.R. 652, at 653. 
87 Perry (2015) 131 L.Q.R. 652, at 670. 
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elsewhere.88 Harris’s “residual freedom” explanation also presents constitutional problems of its own, 
because it provides that the Crown is free to act without legal authority when other organs of state are 
not. The idea that this difference in position can be justified by reference to the Crown’s status as a 
corporation sole has been doubted,89 including by Harris himself.90 
The second response is that it is wrong to assume, which both Elliott and Perry seem to,91  that 
third-source powers must be amenable to judicial review. The answer surely hinges on the issue of 
precisely what it is that third-source power allows the Crown to do. Like the related issue of the 
constitutional basis for such powers, this is also matter of some debate that is not fully resolved by 
analogising with the legal position of private individuals – as Lord Sumption suggested when he 
questioned whether third-source power could justify “public or governmental action, as opposed to 
purely managerial acts of a kind that any natural person could do, such as making contracts, acquiring 
or disposing of property, hiring and firing staff and the like”.92 With the Harris-Perry focus on the 
individual in mind, it is arguable that third-source power should only be subject to the ordinary common 
law, because individuals would not be amenable to judicial review when engaging in the same 
activities. This argument would of course be precluded by the rule of law where the government is using 
a power that allows it to override the individual’s common-law rights, as statutory and prerogative power 
may do. Since the ordinary common law is necessarily useless to the individual in the face of such a 
power, judicial review is the only means of ensuring that the government is subject to the law. But there 
is no reason why the rule of law should require judicial review when the government is exercising no 
greater legal power than the individual enjoys. The requirement that government acts under law can 
surely be satisfied by applying the ordinary common law alone. There may of course be other 
arguments for believing the review of third-source power to be desirable, but this simply returns us to 
the vexed issue of how to weigh these arguments up; of what, precisely, are the underlying purposes of 
judicial review. As Elliott’s thesis recognises, the answer to this question may be that there are 
numerous purposes whose relative importance is a matter of debate rather than anything more 
concrete. 
Elliott’s attempt to justify judicial review of third-source power on the basis of the need to “take 
account of institutional as well as legal considerations when determining questions of amenability”,93 is 
unpersuasive. It defeats the focus on the function to say that the activity should be reviewable merely 
                                                          
88 John Howell, ‘What the Crown May Do’ [2010] J.R. 36. 
89 Howell [2010] J.R. 36, at [24]-[27]. 
90 Harris (2007) 123 L.Q.R. 225, at 239. 
91 Elliott [2012] NZLR 75, at 84, 94; Perry (2015) 131 L.Q.R. 652, at 665. The view is reflected in e.g. Shrewsbury and 
Atcham Borough Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2008] EWCA Civ 148; [2008] 3 All 
E.R. 548, at [74] (Richards L.J.). 
92 New London College [2013] UKSC 51, at [28]. 
93 Elliott [2012] NZLR 75, at 94. 
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because the state performs it. Nor is the problem solved by noting that a given act may be more 
harmful when done by the state than by the individual,94 true as the observation may be. It is also 
difficult to see where Elliott’s argument ends. If all government third-source powers belong in judicial 
review, then why not all other forms of government power – contractual power, for instance – too? 
Indeed, it is for institutional reasons that Sue Arrowsmith advocates treating government contractual 
power as straightforwardly reviewable: “It is the public nature of the body which is significant and not 
the nature of the function”.95 Elliott does not expressly address the issue but cautions against 
“improperly elevat[ing] institutional above functional considerations”, emphasising that judicial review 
should extend beyond the institutions of the state, to the exercise of de facto governmental functions by 
non-state bodies as well.96 The ultimate amenability question, he says, is whether the defendant’s act 
“engages the normative criteria underpinning judicial review to an extent sufficient to render such 
review constitutionally appropriate”.97 But this is precisely the difficulty with Elliott’s central thesis: how 
to balance the various considerations – what constitutes a “sufficient extent” to which those criteria are 
engaged, or an “improper” elevation of institutional above functional considerations – is necessarily 
unclear. The critic is left feeling that Elliott is able to balance these factors to whatever end he desires. 
 
The Argument from Scope 
A second counter-argument is that my source-based focus is unfair for being under-inclusive; that my 
conception of a public function fails to do its job if judicial review only reaches into the private sphere to 
the extent of the statutory powers of bodies that are not institutionally part of the state. We have already 
seen that Elliott is keen to justify judicial review of contracted-out services, for example,98 and that in his 
tripartite list of principles he includes consideration (c) (securing the public interest in good governance) 
to guard against what could otherwise be seen as an under-inclusive amenability test. Some authors 
would even go one step further and argue that judicial review should apply to any bodies – whether 
institutionally public or private – who wield power that has the potential to impact on the rights and 
interests of those who are subject to it.99 We are reminded of their Lordships’ concerns in Datafin, that 
the City Panel wielded enormous power and could oppress its subjects by going off the rails. 
                                                          
94 As does Howell [2010] J.R. 36, at [97]. 
95 Arrowsmith (1990) 106 L.Q.R. 277, at 283. 
96 Elliott [2012] NZLR 75, at 94. 
97 Elliott [2012] NZLR 75, at 94. 
98 As is Paul Craig, ‘Contracting Out, the Human Rights Act and the Scope of Judicial Review’ (2002) 118 L.Q.R. 551. 
99 John Laws, ‘Public law and employment law: abuse of power’ [1997] P.L. 455, at 464; Gordon Borrie, ‘The regulation of 
public and private power’ [1989] P.L. 552, at 558-559; Lord Woolf, ‘Public law – private law: why the divide? – a personal 
view’ [1986] P.L. 220, at 224-225; Hunt, ‘Constitutionalism and the Contractualisation of Government in the United 
Kingdom’, at pp 32-33. 
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This counter-argument is an important one. At least in conversation it tends to be the first port of 
call for lawyers who seek to challenge particular conceptions of amenability that they feel to be too 
broad or narrow, armed with examples of what they regard to be rank unfairness generated by a given 
test. The argument that the meaning of a public function should be sensitive to the demands of fairness 
is not without force given that the common law does not operate in a vacuum. Nevertheless, it is 
important to be aware of the subjectivity that necessarily underlies arguments as to the normatively 
‘correct’ or ‘fairest’ scope of judicial review. While there would be little dissent from the view that the 
state should be required to use its power fairly, the question becomes much thornier and more 
contestable where private defendants are concerned. In this context, courts asking whether a function 
should be subjected to judicial review are essentially asking whether one private individual should be 
made to act fairly for the benefit of another or others. In judicial review the question is also a peculiarly 
general, abstract one – which manifestations of private bodies’ power should be exercised fairly? – 
rather than the more specific, private-law one of which acts should generate liability in discrete contexts 
like negligence, nuisance and breach of contract. 
It will therefore be difficult for mere appeals to fairness to demonstrate that a particular approach to 
amenability must be wrong. There is scarcely a single amenability formulation that could please 
everybody. While Campbell and other authors feel that the courts should subject monopoly industry 
self-regulators to judicial review,100 for example, it is doubtful that it is self-evidently ‘fairer’ for this to 
happen. The matter is a deeply complex one with no obvious answer. It calls for careful consideration of 
the regulators’ own interests, the interests of third parties like their employees, wider factors relating to 
the economy of the particular industries in which the regulators operate, and so on. It is a classically 
“polycentric” matter,101 in Lon Fuller’s words,102 doubtfully resolvable by technocratic or judicial-style 
reasoning alone.103 Polycentricity need not preclude review, of course,104 but there is a strong case 
against assuming that the requirements of fairness in this context can be easily, still less instinctively, 
discerned. It is also no answer to argue that the common law should be on guard with such bodies 
because judicial review is concerned to prevent abuse of power, and the claimant may have no other 
remedy. This wrongly assumes not just that abuse of power is the only relevant consideration, but also 
that private-law doctrines such as contract and tort may justifiably fail to remedy the perceived injustice 
                                                          
100 E.g. Jack Anderson, ‘An Accident of History: Why the Decisions of Sports Governing Bodies are not Amenable to Judicial 
Review’ (2006) 35 Comm. L. World. Rev. 173; Eileen Kelly, ‘Judicial review of sports’ bodies decisions: comparable 
common law perspectives’ [2011] I.S.L.R. 71. 
101 Nigel Pleming, ‘Judicial Review of Regulators’, in Christopher Forsyth et al (eds), Effective Judicial Review: A 
Cornerstone of Good Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) p 332, at p 341. 
102 Lon Fuller, ‘The Forms and Limits of Adjudication’ (1978) 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353. 
103 See also Dawn Oliver, ‘Towards the Horizontal Effect of Administrative Justice Principles’, in Michael Adler (ed), 
Administrative Justice in Context (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010) p 229, at p 230. 
104 Paul Craig, ‘Political Constitutionalism and Judicial Review’, in Forsyth et al, Effective Judicial Review, p 19, at p 39. 
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faced by the claimant when judicial review may not. Quite why judicial review rather than any other area 
of law should have to bear this burden is unclear, as is the reason why Parliament cannot be left some 
space to remedy the injustice by enacting new legislation. When the underlying issues are complex and 
better suited to democratic than judicial resolution, this may even be the preferable option. Hoffmann 
L.J. once remarked along similar lines that it was improper to “patch up the remedies available against 
domestic bodies by pretending that they are organs of government.”105 As Coulson J. recently put it, 
“the administrative court [sic.] is not there simply to fill the gaps left by statute or the common law”.106 
It is also important to appreciate that not even an approach that is capable of working what are 
accepted to be unfair results must be written off. Fairness, of course, is not the only relevant 
consideration in the present context. It must be balanced against the requirements of certainty and 
predictability. Even the thinnest conceptions of the rule of law require the law to guide individuals’ 
conduct effectively.107 In any event, a better alternative to abandoning an ‘unfair’ approach might be to 
give that approach a broad-brush interpretation (as I suggested above, in relation to contracted-out 
functions). Particularly under the Human Rights Act 1998,108 but outwith that context as well,109 the 
courts have shown a keen ability to interpret the law creatively where important rights and interests are 
at stake. The idea of broadly construing rather than abandoning a source-based approach would also 
seem particularly attractive when what is being championed as its replacement is the inherently vaguer 
alternative of asking simply whether the ‘power’ or ‘impact’ of the function is such as to render the 
function amenable to review. Formulations like these have been criticised by authors, including 
Elliott,110 who rightly doubt the courts’ capacity to develop and apply them reliably. Julia Black believes 
such formulations “[do] too much, by [assimilating] all forms of power under one rubric and [applying] 
the same principles to them”.111 Paul Craig argues that they render the public-function test a mere 
“conclusory label” that “cannot guide our reasoning in advance”.112 John Allison remarks that such 
formulations move lawyers “from the unknown to the more unknown”, requiring judges to elaborate a 
genealogy of power along Foucauldian or Galbraithian lines.113 Arguments against a particular 
                                                          
105 R v Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex p. Aga Khan [1993] 1 W.L.R. 909, at 933; [1993] 2 All E.R. 853. 
106 T.H. v Chapter of Worcester Cathedral [2016] EWHC 1117 (Admin), at [76]. 
107 See e.g. Joseph Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue’ (1977) 93 L.Q.R. 195, at 202. 
108 Both under the interpretative obligation (s.3) and the common-law horizontal effect of the ECHR (ss.6(1) and 6(3)(a)). 
109 As in e.g. Anisminic Ltd. v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 A.C. 147; [1969] 1 All E.R. 208; R v Home 
Secretary, ex p. Simms [2000] 2 A.C. 115; [1999] 3 All E.R. 400; R (Evans) v Attorney-General [2015] UKSC 21; [2015] A.C. 
1787. 
110 Elliott [2012] NZLR 75, at 76. 
111 Black (1996) 59 M.L.R. 24, at 29. 
112 Paul Craig, ‘Public Law Control over Private Power’, at p 200. 
113 John Allison, ‘Theoretical and Institutional Underpinnings of a Separate Administrative Law’, in Taggart, The Province of 
Administrative Law, p 71, at pp 87-88. 
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approach that over-focus on the scope of review are therefore unable to demonstrate much, and are 
not a convincing reason – at least on their own – for returning to the drawing board. 
 
The Doctrinal Argument 
Finally, it might be argued that my focus on source of power is unsustainable in the light of the apparent 
decision to usher in a novel, nature-based approach in Datafin. Space precludes a detailed analysis of 
the case-law here, but the short response is that the argument over-states the effect of Datafin and 
subsequent cases. It is far from clear that an approach based on the nature of the power has taken 
hold, at least fully.114 Perhaps because Lloyd L.J. suggested in Datafin that the nature of the power only 
becomes relevant between the extremes of statutory power (reviewable) and contractual power 
(unreviewable),115 the courts remain quite some way from abandoning source of power altogether. It is 
tolerably clear that the exercise of statutory power by private bodies will be amenable to review – at 
least when the power is a public-interest power of the sort exercised by private hospitals, discussed 
above. The courts have also been historically reluctant to review exercises of contractual power (even 
by obviously public bodies such as local authorities),116 a position they appear to maintain even post-
Datafin.117 Not only is the position maintained, but some judges strongly believe it to be correct. Brooke 
L.J. referred to its logic as “unassailable” in R (West) v Lloyd’s of London.118 In R v Football 
Association, ex p. Football League Ltd., Rose J. described it as an “inescapable” and “not... 
unwelcome” conclusion that the F.A.’s monopoly regulatory functions were private, rooted as they were 
in the contractual agreement of the F.A.’s members.119 The idea that we are forced to abandon a 
source-based focus is certainly not beyond question, either on the theoretical or doctrinal planes. 
 
Summary 
The source of the power is far from irrelevant, yielding important indications as to its public-private 
status. Campbell’s model is flawed for overlooking this crucial point. This is not to say that a simple 
distinction between statutory/prerogative and de facto/contractual power is a panacea that constitutes 
the sum-total of the public-function definition, but Elliott’s suggestion that we are forced to abandon the 
                                                          
114 See Hunt, ‘Constitutionalism and the Contractualisation of Government in the United Kingdom’. 
115 Datafin [1987] Q.B. 815, at 847. 
116 See e.g. R v East Berkshire Health Authority, ex p. Walsh [1985] Q.B. 152; [1984] 3 All E.R. 425; R v Post Office, ex p. 
Byrne [1975] I.C.R. 221. cf R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. Benwell [1985] Q.B. 554; [1984] 3 All E.R. 
854. 
117 As is evident in particular from the ill-fated challenges to the contractual regulatory functions of the Jockey Club: Aga 
Khan [1993] 1 W.L.R. 909; R v Jockey Club, ex p. Massingberd-Mundy [1993] 2 All E.R. 207; (1990) 2 Admin. L.R 609. cf R 
v Jockey Club, ex p. RAM Racecourses Ltd. [1993] 2 All ER 225; (1991) 5 Admin. L.R. 265. 
118 [2004] EWCA Civ 506; [2004] 3 All E.R. 251, at [30]. 
119 [1993] 2 All E.R. 833, at 838-839; (1992) 4 Admin. L.R. 623. 
18 
 
search for a harder-edged amenability test in favour of a more subjective and open-ended principles-
based approach, is unconvincing. 
 
(ii) De Facto Power and Remedies in Judicial Review 
 
By abandoning source of power, Campbell’s model draws no distinction between de facto and other 
forms of monopoly power such as statutory and prerogative monopoly power. If monopolistic, all de 
facto power presumptively becomes public and amenable to review. I say ‘presumptively’, because 
Campbell attempts to argue that some de facto monopoly power such as parental power will 
nevertheless be unreviewable.120 In doing so he exposes a further flaw in his thesis that I discuss in 
Part B. For now, however, let us confine ourselves to his default position that there is no distinction 
between the different sources of monopoly power in amenability terms, and that de facto monopoly 
power exercised by private bodies is all public and at least prima facie amenable to review. The 
difficulty with this position lies in the consequences of a finding of unlawfulness. In judicial review the 
typical remedy awarded to the claimant is a quashing order, which renders the unlawful decision invalid 
and of no legal effect.121 Two particular problems arise. 
First, quashing the behaviour may be futile in practice. Because bodies that are not institutionally 
part of the state are free to act as they wish within the confines of the law, as seen above, they are 
permitted to engage in all manner of damaging activities towards others that a quashing order will be 
unable to remedy. If for instance a private defendant uses its monopoly de facto power to drive a 
competitor into bankruptcy, or a monopoly sports regulator decides to release damning information 
about an athlete to the outside world, the damage has already been done by the time the case reaches 
court. Nullifying the defendant’s act is pointless. Hence why other areas of law that have developed to 
regulate non-state defendants take a different approach. Private-law causes of action such as contract 
and tort tend to provide for damages as the typical remedy, in order that the consequences of the 
unlawful act may be compensated;122 and criminal law seeks to punish and deter unlawful behaviour by 
meting out fines, prison sentences and the like. It is far from clear that judicial review should be the 
law’s choice tool for responding to the abuse of monopoly de facto power.123 
                                                          
120 Campbell (2009) 125 L.Q.R. 491, at 515-517. 
121 The idea that unlawful behaviour should be invalid has been criticised before as not always suiting the circumstances of 
the case: by e.g. Peter Cane, ‘Do banks dare lend to local authorities?’ (1994) 110 L.Q.R. 514. 
122 In contract law, specific performance and injunctions having the same effect will only be available where damages would 
be an inadequate remedy: South African Territories Ltd. v Wallington [1898] A.C. 309; Sky Petroleum v V.I.P. Petroleum Ltd. 
[1974] 1 W.L.R. 576; [1974] 2 All E.R. 400. 
123 The point is not of course that judicial review should never apply to bodies capable of inflicting irreversible damage. The 
state may readily do so. 
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The second problem is the effect on the defendant, which seems unusually draconian compared to 
other areas of law. Even when a quashing order is of use in the sense that it can undo the defendant’s 
behaviour by rendering it invalid, it would seem to make a significant inroad into the defendant’s 
autonomy. Being invalid, the unlawful act is not just unlawful but is of no legal effect. This is in stark 
contrast to both private and criminal law, where consequences – damages, a criminal conviction etc. – 
follow from an unlawful act, but the validity of the act is left untouched.124 
By its end-game of invalidating unlawful acts, judicial review denies defendants something that 
these other areas of law would seem to allow in practice: namely, the choice of breaking the law and 
paying the price for their behaviour. A strange kind of choice this may seem, but it may be enormously 
beneficial to non-state bodies and individuals in practical terms. They differ fundamentally from the 
state in having interests of their own, of course; and it is natural that they would want to weigh up risks 
and make rational, autonomous choices about how to act. Businesses who wish to commit ‘efficient 
breach’ by reneging on one contract and paying damages in order to do business elsewhere; lazy 
professionals who would rather risk disciplinary action than bother themselves to do competent work; 
murderers who would rather serve a jail sentence than pass up the opportunity to dispatch their 
enemies – all believe they have something to gain from acting unlawfully and facing whatever penalty 
applies. The point is not that such behaviour is laudable or should be lawful, but rather that remedying 
the unlawfulness by stripping the behaviour of any legal effect is a relatively extreme move, even if it 
can be achieved in practice. The problem is a general one with private defendants exercising de facto 
power, monopoly power included. 
Two solutions might be suggested to this problem, neither of which is satisfactory. The first is to 
withhold a quashing order if the effects on the defendant are thought to be too severe. There is no right 
to a remedy in judicial review. Remedial discretion makes for uncertainty, however. It is no substitute for 
squarely confronting the underlying issue that judicial review seems remedially unsuited to private 
defendants exercising de facto power when compared to other areas of law. If this is the true position 
then litigants, claimants included, are better informed of this before proceedings begin. It also tends to 
offend against the rule-of-law requirement of equality before the law for the courts to acknowledge that 
one private individual has acted unlawfully towards another, but nevertheless refuse to remedy that 
unlawfulness. This is not to say it never happens,125 but rather that it will be something that courts and 
claimants alike will want to avoid. Indeed, rule-of-law concerns have been raised in relation to the 
recent procedural reforms that require relief to be withheld in judicial review if “highly likely that the 
                                                          
124 Void contracts are a notable exception, however. 
125 It did in e.g. Stevenage Borough F.C. Ltd. v Football League Ltd. (1997) 9 Admin. L.R. 109 (not a judicial review case), 
but the reasons were the claimant’s conduct and the effect that issuing a remedy would have on third parties. 
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outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different if the conduct complained of had 
not occurred.”126 
The second potential solution is therefore to issue another remedy in place of a quashing order. 
Damages are unavailable in judicial review for a breach of the principles of good administration,127 but 
declarations, injunctions and mandatory and prohibiting orders may be issued.128 Problems also arise 
here, however. Declarations would serve little purpose. As mere (albeit binding) statements of the 
parties’ rights, there is no means of enforcement. Defendants are free to ignore them. Declarations may 
be a powerful remedy where the defendant exercises statutory or prerogative power,129 because a 
declaration of unlawfulness will indicate that the defendant’s behaviour is ultra vires the defendant’s 
powers and therefore liable to be struck down if it continues. This is required by parliamentary 
sovereignty and the rule of law, especially where the defendant purports to use its power to override the 
claimant’s common-law rights. Declarations may also be useful in relation to contractual power, 
because a declaration of unlawfulness will indicate that there is no contractual right to do what has 
been done. But with private defendants’ de facto power, the position necessarily differs and the 
constitutional impetus to quash the unlawful act disappears. And if the courts do quash it, then we 
simply return to the first problem, of quashing acts that are carried out pursuant to de facto power.130 
This leaves the specific remedies of injunctions and mandatory and prohibiting orders, all of which 
require the defendant either to do, or to refrain from doing, a particular act. Again, however, problems 
arise with making any of these the typical remedy in judicial review. None of them provide for the 
invalidation of the defendant’s behaviour in the way a quashing order does, but in practice the result is 
nevertheless similar because the defendant is forced by the court to act lawfully in the end. Liability in 
contempt of court and hence fines – in more serious cases,131 sequestration of assets and jail – are 
used by the court not just to punish the disobedience but to secure practical compliance with the 
order.132 
Once again, I am not suggesting that unlawful behaviour of the sort I describe is laudable or must 
be dealt with leniently. Nor am I overlooking the obvious fact that criminal law may make severe inroads 
into the autonomy of defendants who receive stiff sentences for committing serious crimes. The point is 
                                                          
126 Senior Courts Act (‘SCA’), s.31(2A), added by the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, s.84. See Bingham Centre for 
the Rule of Law, JUSTICE and the Public Law Project, Introduction to the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, Part 4 
(London, 2015), at [1.20]. 
127 SCA, s.31(4). 
128 SCA, s.31(1)-(2). 
129 O’Reilly [1983] 2 A.C. 237, at 274 (Lord Diplock). 
130 The argument would apply equally to a declaration that had the same effect as a quashing order in these circumstances. 
131 For discussion see Arlidge, Eady & Smith On Contempt (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), at [12-19] – [12-24]. 
132 These are said to be the dual objectives in the contempt context: Robinson v Robinson [2001] EWCA Civ 2098, at [11] 
(Ward L.J.); Crystalmews v Metterick [2006] EWHC 3087, at [8] (Lawrence Collins J.). 
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subtler: that the remedial scheme in judicial review is geared towards abuse of power by the state, and 
by private defendants exercising statutory powers, and poses problems when extended to private 
defendants’ de facto power. When considered alongside the theoretical significance of source of power, 
it becomes clear that regulating such power in judicial review is by no means something we are driven 
to accept in the way Campbell and other authors seem to suggest. 
 
B. MONOPOLY POWER: THE NORMATIVE CASE 
 
In this Part I turn to two further flaws in Campbell’s normative case for the monopoly power model: first, 
that it focuses simply on the degree of power; and second, that his attempts to bolster the model using 
the rule of law are unpersuasive. 
 
(i) Degree of Power 
 
The monopoly power model’s sole concern is whether or not the power is monopolistic. Its focus is 
therefore entirely on the degree of power; on how much power the body exercises. Only monopolistic 
functions will be amenable to judicial review. 
The focus on degree of power can generate arbitrary results in practice, however. Those familiar 
with the film Forrest Gump will recall that the protagonist’s fledgling shrimping company acquired a 
monopoly overnight when a hurricane sank his competitors’ boats. The circumstances were entirely 
beyond the company’s control, yet under Campbell’s model its good fortune would render it amenable 
to review. To some this may be unproblematic – if monopoly power requires regulation in judicial 
review, then so be it – but the example also unmasks a deeper conceptual problem. It demonstrates 
that monopolies can be created in a number of ways: by one’s own efforts in acquiring the monopoly, 
by the efforts of another, by mere accident, by statute, by prerogative, and so on. But Campbell claims 
that monopoly power is public in nature, and therefore qualitatively different to all the other forms of 
power that he necessarily regards as private. He makes no attempt to explain why this is so; to explain 
what is distinctively public about monopoly power. The entirety of his normative case rests on the 
argument that monopoly power should be exercised fairly and therefore subjected to judicial review. But 
this is a different argument. It explains why monopoly power should be regulated according to the 
substantive principles of good administration, not why it is public in nature. 
In fact, the monopoly model says rather odd things about the nature of public power. First, in 
focussing on the degree of power alone, it ignores the obvious point that the state is more than simply a 
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monopoly actor. As discussed above, the state also claims the authority to use its power. Second, the 
monopoly model also fails to appreciate that quintessentially public functions may not be monopolistic 
anyway. Take phone-tapping, for example, which few would have difficulty regarding as a public 
function and thus amenable to judicial review, at least when done by the state.133 Under the Regulation 
of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, it can be carried out by a range of bodies including the Metropolitan 
Police and G.C.H.Q.134 But if multiple bodies happen to tap the same individual’s phone, the implication 
is that the function becomes private under Campbell’s model because neither would perform a 
monopoly function towards that individual. The example speaks once more to the model’s potential to 
generate arbitrary results in practice, but it also emphasises something more obvious: that monopoly 
power fails to capture publicness in the way Campbell contends. 
How might Campbell respond to these points? One line of argument might be that my concern with 
crafting a neat conceptual definition of publicness misses the point. What really matters, Campbell 
might say, is that judicial review extends to the right functions; that the right kind of power is subjected 
to the substantive principles of good administration. Whether those functions are public – whether 
anything at all is public – is scarcely the point. This is certainly how he puts his normative case: 
monopoly powers should be regarded as public because they ought to be exercised fairly. 
Two responses may be made, however. First, the argument is vulnerable to the point made in Part 
A: that the ‘correct’ scope of review is inherently difficult to determine. Appeals to the ‘correct’ or ‘fairest’ 
scope of review tend to beat the air, exposing Campbell to the criticism that a public-private approach 
built upon more normatively settled foundations would persuade where his cannot. Second, in any 
event it is important not to run away with the idea that ‘publicness’ is somehow an empty conceptual 
shell into which any chosen content can simply be poured. Both Campbell’s and Elliott’s theses are 
open to criticism for overlooking this point. Campbell asks simply how far judicial review should extend; 
Elliott asks simply what judicial review is for. Neither of them attempt to say anything about what 
publicness means. It is true of course that the question of which functions are public is slippery, but this 
does not mean that nothing reliable can be said about it at all. Indeed, I managed to arrive at a source-
based distinction between public and private functions by relying on constitutional fundamentals with 
which few would disagree: that in liberal societies the individual is free to do whatever is not unlawful; 
that the state is not; and hence that the state, unlike the individual, must demonstrate a legal basis for 
its actions. The abstract meaning of a public function may be difficult to determine, but this is no excuse 
                                                          
133 cf Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner (No. 2) [1979] Ch. 344; [1979] 2 All E.R. 620, impugned in Malone v UK 
(1984) 7 E.H.R.R. 14. 
134 Sections 7(1)-(2). 
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for ignoring the issue altogether. It may also help us to arrive at a relatively clear, workable amenability 
test for the reasons expressed in Part A. 
 
(ii) Monopoly Power and the Rule of Law 
 
The second significant flaw in Campbell’s normative case is his attempt to rely on the rule of law.135 The 
argument is that the rule of law “underpins judicial review” and “may operate with regard to power that 
would not in any conventional sense be described as governmental”,136 thus requiring the subjection of 
monopoly power to judicial review. Campbell is at pains to stress that neither “formalist” nor 
“substantive” conceptions of the rule of law limit their focus to power “exercised pursuant to law.”137 
It will be immediately apparent that the argument is circular, seemingly relying on the correctness of 
the very point Campbell sets out to establish: that monopoly power is the kind of power that the law 
should be concerned to keep in check. Independently of his earlier normative arguments in favour of 
subjecting monopoly power to judicial review, there is no attempt to explain why monopoly power is or 
should be the rule of law’s central concern. But even if we take Campbell’s word for it on that point, it 
still gets him nowhere in terms of his overall argument. His thesis is not just that the law should regulate 
monopoly power, but more specifically that monopoly power should be regulated in judicial review. The 
whole argument, of course, is directed towards persuading readers that monopoly powers are public 
functions to which the principles of good administration should apply. Monopoly power may of course 
be regulated through judicial review, but so may it be regulated through legislation, or the private law.138 
Why the rule of law is supposed to prefer judicial review is unclear. Indeed, it has recently been argued 
that the “rule of law and private law are not strangers”,139 private law being said to play an important 
role in safeguarding the rule of law’s values.140 Campbell recognises that the law has been historically 
concerned to guard against the abuse of monopoly power exercised by a variety of bodies including 
private persons such as innkeepers, wharfingers and so on.141 But it has achieved this in a variety of 
ways, not simply through judicial review or through its historical predecessor, the High Court’s 
jurisdiction to issue the prerogative orders of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition. What Campbell 
needs is a rule-of-law reason to prefer judicial review to any other area of law as a means of regulating 
                                                          
135 Campbell (2009) 125 L.Q.R. 491, at 511-515. 
136 Campbell (2009) 125 L.Q.R. 491, at 511. 
137 Campbell (2009) 125 L.Q.R. 491, at 513. 
138 Campbell (2009) 125 L.Q.R. 491, at 504-505. 
139 William Lucy, ‘The Rule of Law and Private Law’, in Lisa Austin and Dennis Klimchuk (eds), Private Law and the Rule of 
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) p 41, at p 66. 
140 See also Trevor Allan, ‘The Rule of Law as the Rule of Private Law’, in Private Law and the Rule of Law, p 41 at p 67. 
141 Campbell (2009) 125 L.Q.R. 491, at 504-506. For analysis of the historical case-law, see Paul Craig, ‘Constitutions, 
property and regulation’ [1991] P.L. 538. 
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monopoly power, but no such reason is provided. It will also be clear from the discussion in Part A that 
there are distinct problems with attempting to regulate de facto non-state power in judicial review 
anyway. I put the case no higher here, but private law may be better suited to regulating such power for 
these reasons alone. 
Given Campbell’s rule-of-law argument it is also worth considering what he would make of cases 
like Nagle v Feilden,142 Mullins v McFarlane143 and Bradley v Jockey Club,144 where the courts use 
private-law doctrine to check the monopoly power exercised by the self-appointed regulator of the 
horseracing industry. If the rule of law really does require monopoly power to be regulated specifically in 
judicial review, then presumably Campbell sees both cases as flying in the face of a bedrock 
constitutional principle; as serious usurpations of judicial review by the private law. It is a logical 
consequence of his argument that the rule of law requires the regulation of monopoly power in judicial 
review rather than by any other legal means, but nowhere is the point addressed. 
 
C. MONOPOLY POWER: THE DOCTRINAL CASE 
 
Campbell’s normative case for the monopoly model is therefore flawed, both on its own terms and for 
its eschewal of the source of the power as a factor in the public-function definition. This Part explores 
his doctrinal case, which I argue is also weak. 
Campbell admits that the monopoly model “has received little express support”,145 but claims that it 
accords with the courts’ decisions to review statutory power and prerogative power, and also the non-
statutory regulatory power that has been subjected to review in cases like Datafin and R v Advertising 
Standards Authority Ltd., ex p Vernons Organisations Ltd.146 Sensibly, his claim is not that the model 
explains every decided case, but rather that it explains the bulk of the case-law.147 Even so, however, 
significant flaws in the model can be seen: first, when examining the cases in which the courts do 
review a given function; and second, when examining the cases in which they do not. 
 
(i) Decisions to Review 
 
As to the first set of cases, it is clear that Campbell’s model is not borne out by the case-law in the 
manner he claims. It is unsurprising that the model tends to accord with the review of statutory and 
                                                          
142 [1966] 2 Q.B. 633; [1966] 1 All E.R. 689. 
143 [2006] EWHC 986; [2006] L.L.R. 437. 
144 [2005] EWCA Civ 1056; [2006] L.L.R. 1. 
145 Campbell (2009) 125 L.Q.R. 491, at 511-515, 495. 
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prerogative powers, because these powers will usually be monopolistic in the sense that they belong 
only to a single body.148 But it does not follow that the monopolistic nature of these functions provides 
the reason for review. As Elliott rightly observes, the argument “confuses empirical observation with 
normative justification”.149 Indeed, it is difficult to believe that the courts would subscribe to the 
monopoly model given the various normative flaws that are apparent in it. 
It should also be borne in mind that statutory and prerogative powers are not necessarily 
monopolistic in the sense that only one person can exercise them. Campbell is right to observe that 
prerogative powers are vested in the Crown,150 but he overlooks that they can be exercised by any 
central government department on the Crown’s behalf. In terms of statutory power, moreover, a 
sovereign Parliament can provide for as many bodies as it wishes to perform the same activity. 
Examples of power-sharing can be seen in s.4 of the Police Act 1964, which provided for the power to 
equip police forces with weapons to be exercised by the Home Secretary as well as the forces 
themselves;151 and the Local Government Act 2000, which permits local authorities to “co-operate with, 
facilitate or co-ordinate the activities of, any person” in the promotion of economic, social and 
environmental wellbeing.152 
Campbell also encounters difficulty with third-source power (what he calls “broad-sense” 
prerogative power),153 which was discussed above. In that discussion I argued that third-source power 
does not necessarily need to be subjected to review, because the answer depends on the unresolved 
question of the constitutional basis of such power, and what it allows the Crown to do. But Campbell 
seems to think it should be reviewable, and that under his model it is, and so it is pertinent to examine 
his claim. In my view the claim is flawed, because third-source power is also not necessarily 
monopolistic. Like prerogative powers, third-source powers are held by the Crown and may be 
exercised by multiple ministries on the Crown’s behalf. There is no reason why the third-source power 
to form contracts, for instance, may not be exercised by the Home Office or Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office as much as by any other central government department.154 
Campbell acknowledges this problem but responds that it fails to undermine his model, because so 
far the courts have only subjected monopolistic third-source powers to judicial review. None of the 
                                                          
148 As Campbell recognises: (2009) 125 L.Q.R. 491, at 496. 
149 Elliott [2012] NZLR 75, at 79. 
150 Campbell (2009) 125 L.Q.R. 491, at 499. 
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v Home Office [1994] 1 A.C. 377, at 424 (Lord Woolf); [1993] 3 All E.R. 537. 
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decided cases involved powers that were exercised by multiple bodies, he says.155 The cases he 
proffers in support of this point are G.C.H.Q.156 and R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex p. 
Lain.157 In each, he says, the function in question – respectively, providing employment in the signals 
intelligence sector and dispensing compensation to crime victims – was performed by the defendant 
and nobody else at the relevant time. But even if his account of the background to these cases is 
accurate on the facts as they stood at the time the cases were decided, the arguments are “strained”, 
as Elliott observes.158 The reader is left with the uneasy feeling that Campbell’s model simply tracks the 
case-law to date, relying on the simple fortuity that the courts may not yet have had the chance to 
review a non-monopolistic third-source power, or that a power that may have been exercisable by 
multiple bodies was in practice monopolistic because it only happened to be exercised by a single 
body. If in future the courts decide to review beyond either of these contours, Campbell’s model will be 
unable to account for the decision. Campbell would doubtless be confident that this would never 
happen, or that any decision on the courts’ part to extend judicial review in this way would be wrong: if 
his model is accurate, the courts should decline to review the exercise of non-monopolistic third-source 
power precisely because it is non-monopolistic. But this would be a question-begging response, for 
taking both his normative and doctrinal cases to be correct. The correctness of those cases is the very 
issue in question. 
 
(ii) Refusals to Review 
 
The greater part of the weakness in Campbell’s doctrinal claim is exposed by considering those cases 
in which the courts do not review a given power. There are countless examples of situations in which 
the courts refuse to review power that is evidently monopolistic. One such case, R (Holmcroft 
Properties) v K.P.M.G., was decided only last year. Holmcroft concerned the power of accountancy firm 
K.P.M.G., as an independent reviewer, to approve the offers of compensation for mis-selling made by 
Barclays Bank to its customers. K.P.M.G. was the only body performing the function in question – under 
Campbell’s definition, it was exercising a monopoly power – but the Administrative Court held that its 
duties did “not have sufficient public law flavour to render it amenable to judicial review”.159 Significantly, 
the courts are notably reluctant to review the power exercised by monopoly regulators such as the 
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Jockey Club, at least where the power has a contractual basis.160 The same is true of the Chief Rabbi’s 
disciplinary powers, as demonstrated by R v Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations of Great 
Britain, ex p. Wachmann.161  
Campbell’s answer to this doctrinal dilemma is twofold.162 First, he argues that cases refusing to 
recognise monopoly power as public are wrongly decided. He takes issue with the courts’ typical 
justification, namely that the monopoly functions in cases like Wachmann are private because the 
claimant has voluntarily assumed the defendant’s power over them, for instance by willingly operating in 
a particular industry under a particular regulator’s jurisdiction. As Farquharson L.J. stated in relation to 
the monopoly power of the Jockey Club, for example, “nobody is obliged to race his horses in this 
country”.163 Campbell believes such a justification to be unpersuasive because statutory jurisdictions 
can also be voluntarily assumed, yet statutory power nevertheless tends to be amenable to review. I 
would agree that the courts’ justification is inadequate: a better justification would be that the powers in 
question, being contractual, were private because they lacked a public source. But Campbell’s 
insistence that the results in these cases are wrong is problematic, because it involves simply writing off 
an established line of case-law. His doctrinal case therefore begins to crack. 
Campbell’s second answer to the dilemma is more troublesome still. He argues that some of the 
results in these cases can nevertheless be salvaged and “reconceptualised”164 as instances of non-
justiciability: the courts are right to regard the functions of religious leaders, for example, as beyond the 
reach of judicial review. Even though it wrongly classified the Chief Rabbi’s function as private rather 
than public, Campbell argues that Wachmann, for example, was therefore rightly decided on the facts. 
The argument is fraught with difficulty, however. First, it is not the case that religious functions are 
non-justiciable per se. In R v Bury Park Imam, ex p. Ali,165 which Campbell omits to mention, the Court 
of Appeal upheld Auld J.’s ruling that an Imam exercised only private functions when compiling a list of 
the eligible voters in his mosque’s forthcoming executive committee election. The judgment was put on 
the basis that the Imam’s power derived from the consensual submission of his subjects, which, again, I 
would agree with Campbell is an unpersuasive justification. But their Lordships were nevertheless clear 
that the religious nature of the Imam’s functions would not be enough on its own to preclude review. 
Roch L.J., with whom Balcombe and McCowan L.JJ. agreed, stated that the religious element “would 
not have led me to reject this appeal, had I been persuaded that the Imam was exercising a public law 
function.” 
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Second, the non-justiciability argument exposes a stark tension between Campbell’s normative and 
doctrinal cases. If normative arguments so strongly compel the conclusion that monopoly power must 
be subjected to judicial review, then Campbell’s casual acquiescence in the idea that certain monopoly 
functions naturally lie beyond the courts’ control is difficult to understand. Having set out his normative 
case in forceful terms, and having attempted to root that case in something as constitutionally 
fundamental as the rule of law, he then appears to beat a hasty retreat for doctrinal purposes, stressing 
that regulating monopoly power is not the be-all and end-all: 
 
“It does not follow… that judicial review must always be available in respect of the exercise of 
monopoly power. The argument that review be available in respect of monopoly power is 
weighty, but is not incapable of being outweighed. While the subjection of decisions to the 
principles of good administration – and, thereby, to the requirements of the rule of law – is one 
concern of English public law, it is not the only concern.”166 
 
It would seem that normative reason has suddenly given way to simple impressionistic concerns as to 
how far the net of judicial review should be cast. This is by no means surprising. As argued in Part B, it 
is difficult to escape the black hole of subjectivity if we begin from the starting point of trying to identify 
the ‘correct’ scope of judicial review. Indeed, this element of impressionism is reflected in the 
arguments Campbell makes about cutting down the scope of the monopoly model, which he admits is 
capable of generating prima facie counterintuitive results, for example when it implies that the monopoly 
functions exercised by parents towards their children are public.167 The other weighty concerns that he 
believes to prevail over the need to subject monopoly power to judicial review include upholding 
“important constitutional value[s]” such as “maintaining the separation between Church and State”, or 
safeguarding the autonomy of the family unit.168 
The result is that parental and religious monopoly functions may be excluded from the scope of 
review without doing the monopoly model any harm, or so we are told. Yet there is scarcely any attempt 
to justify these views. In the case of parental functions, Campbell’s thinking rests on the mere 
assumption that “no one would think that decisions made by a parent with regard to its child should be 
subject to judicial review”.169 He simply asserts without more that there are no constitutional issues in 
play with sports regulators.170 But even if correct – and I doubt that it is self-evidently right for the courts 
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to subject monopoly regulators to judicial review, as explained above – these statements remain 
descriptive ones that say nothing by way of justification for the position. Quite how we are supposed to 
identify the important constitutional values of the sort Campbell mentions remains a mystery, as does 
the means of determining whether these values are sufficiently important to trump what he claims is 
otherwise a strong normative case in favour of judicially reviewing monopoly power. 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
 
In the face of the flaws identified in the monopoly model, there would seem to be two choices: either 
embrace the model, warts and all, or consider the possibility that an alternative model may be more 
plausible in both normative and doctrinal terms. As I have argued, we should give serious thought to 
whether this alternative model might be based on source of power, unfashionable as that idea may 
seem. This conclusion arises partly from Campbell’s failure to establish his case, but also from the 
difficulties I have identified with the underlying view that source of power has had its day. Neither 
theoretically nor doctrinally is this view convincingly established. Elliott’s reminder that source of power 
should feature in the amenability test is welcome, but does not go far enough. Rather than committing 
to source of power as a reliable indicator of publicness, his thesis falters by balancing it against other 
considerations in a multi-factorial and ultimately subjective assessment. Source of power deserves 
more attention and prominence than that. My intention has not been to advance a developed case for 
an alternative source-based model, as I have said. The extent of the doctrinal support for a source-
based model – in particular whether it can accommodate Datafin, which appeared to usher in a novel 
nature-based test – remains to be explored in future work. But I hope to have contributed to the debate 
by explaining why the fashionable view of amenability is mistaken and why, counter-intuitively, last 
season’s clothes may be desirable once again. 
